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The Liberal Democrats’ performance in the 2015 general election provides an opportunity to examine the
only case in the post-war period of a national junior coalition partner in British politics. Comparative
research highlights competence, trust and leadership as three key challenges facing junior coalition
parties. This article uses British Election Study data to show that the Liberal Democrats failed to convince
the electorate on all three counts. The article also uses constituency-level data to examine the continued
benefits of incumbency to the party and the impact of constituency campaigning. It finds that while the
incumbency advantage remained for the Liberal Democrats, it was ultimately unable to mitigate the
much larger national collapse.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction
At the 2010 British general election, the Liberal Democrats won
23 percent of the vote and 57 seats. It was an electorally relevant
share of seats that, following five days of negotiations, facilitated
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. Despite arguably
satisfying the office-seeking and policy-seeking criteria associated
with coalition theory (Bale, 2012), the electoral prospects for the
Liberal Democrats were bleak. The comparative literature on co-
alitions suggests that junior coalition parties tend to struggle in
subsequent elections, and often face an uphill battle to get noticed
by the electorate (Bolleyer, 2008; Dunphy and Bale, 2011). The
challenge for junior parties in coalition is to be competent in gov-
ernment, while maintaining party distinctiveness and popular
leadership (Boston and Bullock, 2012; Paun and Munro, 2013). The
case of the Liberal Democrats provides a unique opportunity to
apply the comparative literature on junior coalition parties to the
British context.
Following heavy defeats in local, sub-national and national
elections during the 2010 parliament, the Liberal Democrats ran a(C. Johnson), a.middleton@highly defensive campaign ahead of the 2015 general election
(Coetzee, 2015). It was unsuccessful. The Liberal Democrats won 7.9
percent of the vote and just 8 seats. In urban areas of northern
England where they had built up support as the opposition to La-
bour in both local and Westminster elections, they were heavily
beaten. Standing against the Conservatives in the south west of
England, long-standing Liberal Democrat MPs were wiped out. In
Scotland, along with Labour and the Conservatives, they lost
heavily to the Scottish National Party. Their efforts over a genera-
tion towin an electorally relevant share of seats have nowcollapsed
and will take a monumental effort to rebuild.
This article examines the reasons behind the Liberal Democrats’
collapse at the 2015 general election. The first section places the
Liberal Democrats’ experience within the comparative literature on
junior coalition parties, and outlines various explanations for their
collapse. The second section analyses the Liberal Democrats’
particularly defensive campaign strategy in the 2015 general elec-
tion, and examines the continued importance of incumbency to the
party. It finds that while the incumbency effect still reaps benefits
for the Liberal Democrats, it was not enough towithstand the fall in
the national vote. The third section utilises data from the 2015
British Election Study to identify the individual reasons behind
voting (or not) for the Liberal Democrats. It finds that the Liberal
Democrats suffered badly due to a lack of perceived competence
1 The threshold at which people start paying income tax was £7475 in
2010e2011, and now stands at £10,600 (as of the financial year 2015e2016). The
pupil premium ring-fences money in the education budget to go directly to the
most deprived schools in the country. The coalition government abolished identity
cards and child detention, radically reformed the pensions system, and imple-
mented much of the Liberal Democrats’ environmental policy.
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This article contributes not only to analysis of the Liberal
Democrats, but also informs broader comparative literature in two
key respects. First, the 2010e2015 Conservative-Liberal Democrat
coalition was the first formal UK coalition in the post-war period,
and examining the Liberal Democrats’ collapse in the 2015 general
election informs broader analysis of junior parties in coalition. It
explores whether junior parties must always suffer in coalition and
the key tasks for them to overcome the challenges they face. Sec-
ond, the article also examines the continuing success of constitu-
ency campaigning and incumbency strategies, shown to be
important both to the Liberal Democrats but also to political parties
more broadly (Fisher et al., 2011, 2015; Smith, 2013). How suc-
cessful was this in the 2015 general election? This article examines
these questions.
2. The comparative perspective and electoral context
The comparative literature on coalitions works from two main
criteria. First, as parties are office-seeking, they should share as
many of the spoils of office with as few parties as possible (Riker,
1962). When achieved, this is known as the minimum-winning
coalition: a government that has an overall majority (winning)
amongst the smaller number of parties (minimum). Second, parties
are also policy-seeking, and look to form coalitions that broadly
coincide with their principles and policy programmes (Axelrod,
1970). When achieved alongside office-seeking priorities, the
resulting government is the minimum-winning connected
coalition.
When the Liberal Democrats joined the Conservatives in coali-
tion following the 2010 general election, they arguably satisfied
these two main criteria (Bale, 2012). Needing 326 MPs to pass a
Queen’s Speech and budget, Labour, with 258 MPs, could not even
begin to think about governing without the support of the Liberal
Democrats’ 57 MPs. Meanwhile, the Conservatives on their own
with 307 MPs would have also found themselves short should a
‘rainbow coalition’ of the centre-left (including the Liberal Demo-
crats) try and defeat them. Even if the Conservatives could pass a
Queen’s Speech, they would have been unable to govern comfort-
ably. The subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, with
a de-facto majority of 80, was therefore the minimum-winning
coalition. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition also argu-
ably satisfied the policy-seeking requirement. The Liberal Demo-
crats’ professionalisation in recent years has been accompanied by
a more equidistant strategy that made a coalition with the Con-
servatives easier to navigate (Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011).
Boston and Bullock (2012) note the tension that exists between
governmental unity and party distinctiveness. This tension is
particularly strong for junior parties in coalition without a history
of government and coalitional compromise (Bolleyer, 2008), such
as the Liberal Democrats. Howdid the Liberal Democrats perform in
the 2010 parliament in this regard? Bennister and Heffernan (2015)
argued that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition was
defined by consensus and compromise, with both sides operating
from a position of mutual trust and respect. Despite doubts that it
would be the case (Bale, 2012), the coalition lasted the full five years
with remarkably few threats to its existence. What of party
distinctiveness? An analysis of the 2010 coalition agreement be-
tween the two parties showed that both parties satisfied the main
commitments of their manifesto, and the Liberal Democrats in
particular were in a position to deliver much of the minutiae of
their manifesto (Quinn et al., 2011). However in doing so, they gave
ground to the Conservatives on the key issues of deficit reduction,
tax, welfare, education, health, immigration and defence policy
(Bale and Webb, 2015). As Bale (2012: 328) wryly notes, thecoalition agreement showed ‘what happens when vegetarians
negotiate with carnivores’.
The unity/distinctiveness dilemma invites a key question in
relation to how junior parties are perceived in coalition: who do
voters blame or credit for a coalition government’s performance?
Comparative evidence suggests that the lead governing party
within a coalition, the ‘proposer’ of the coalition and the party with
the ‘chief executive’, will bear most of the responsibility with voters
for government performance (Duch et al., 2015; Fisher and Hobolt,
2010). This suggests that in the UK context of 2010e2015, the
Conservatives were more likely to be credited or blamed by the
electorate than the Liberal Democrats for the government’s per-
formance. Indeed, while the Liberal Democrats can claim successful
implementation of some of their policies1, polling conducted in
2014 suggested that the Liberal Democrats’ key policy delivered in
government, such as increasing the income tax threshold, was
primarily associated by the voters with the Conservatives (Bennett,
2014). As Behr (2014) argues, ‘one difference between opposition
and government for Liberal Democrats has been that, before coa-
lition, no one noticed what they said; now, no one notices what
they do’. In short, by prioritising coalition unity in the early years
of the coalition, they sacrificed party distinctiveness (McEnhill,
2015).
The Liberal Democrats’ lack of influence and distinctiveness
suggests that their collapse can be explained by their voters feeling
betrayed by the party (Cutts and Russell, 2015). More generally,
Muller and Strom (1999) highlight the importance of maintaining
party legitimacy, while Dunphy and Bale (2011) suggest that parties
risk losing their identity in coalition with a larger party. Dommett
(2013) suggests that a number of decisions by the Liberal Demo-
crats created a schism between their rhetoric as an opposition party
and their rhetoric in government, fostering a perception of distrust
and betrayal.
Junior coalition parties also face a number of other challenges.
First, theymust appear competent as a party in government (Muller
and Strom, 1999). Clarke et al. (2009) argue that competence has
increasingly shaped party competition in Britain. Green (2015) ar-
gues that the Liberal Democrats’ perceived competence on their key
policy issues increased support for the party. However as this
support has been gained based on difference from the two major
parties (Green and Hobolt, 2008), the argument arises that they
might have lost competence on key issues after aligning themselves
too closely to the Conservatives in coalition. Indeed, on the three
key valence issues ahead of the 2015 general election (the economy,
immigration and health care), the Conservatives were more trusted
than the Liberal Democrats (YouGov, 2015).
As well as perception of competence of parties’ key policy issues,
the competence and popularity of party leaders is also argued to be
important. Stokes (1992) argues that an assessment of a party’s
competence is shaped ‘from its experience with the parties and the
leaders, and the results they achieve, over time’. The assessment of
a party leader is thus something to be considered alongside
assessment of a broader political party (Clarke et al., 2009;
Whiteley et al., 2013). At the 2010 general election, party leader
Nick Clegg was a source of electoral advantage for the Liberal
Democrats (Cutts, 2012; Middleton, 2015). However, his popularity
plunged throughout the 2010 parliament, and he was regarded as
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Fig. 1. Liberal democrat poll ratings, 2010e2015. Note: National opinion polling data between May 2010 and May 2015, taken from Mark Pack (2015) national opinion polling
database.2
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ahead of the 2015 general election (Denver, 2015).
The Liberal Democrats’ poll rating dipped quickly and then
continually fell during the 2010 parliament (see Fig. 1), and the
2015 general election saw the near-wipeout of Liberal Democrat
MPs. They received just 7.9 percent of the vote, a drop of 15.2
percentage points on their performance in 2010. They returned just
8 MPs, compared with 57 MPs in 2010. Of the 49 seats lost, 28 were
lost to the Conservatives, 12 to Labour and 9 to the Scottish National
Party. They made no gains, and their vote share fell in every con-
stituency across the country. Whilst in 2010 the Liberal Democrats
did not lose a single deposit3, in 2015 they lost 340 deposits, costing
them £170,000. The next section explains the constituency factors
behind the party’s collapse.3. Liberal Democrat local performance
This section examines the locally targeted strategy of the Liberal
Democrat campaign. Despite the fall in the party’s national support,
various academic forecasting models predicted that the party
would do better than a uniform national swing based on opinion
polls would suggest (Monk and Lambert, 2015). This was based on
the party’s ability to target seats through locally focused campaigns
(Cutts, 2014; Fieldhouse et al., 2006). Local campaigning is no
longer an irrelevant sideshow (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988) to the
national campaign, but a way in which political parties in the UK
and beyond can alter local results (Jacobson, 2006; Pattie and
Johnston, 2009; Whiteley and Seyd, 2003). Such a targeted strat-
egy was the only realistic option for the party. Many of the Liberal
Democrats’ MPs had been respected community representatives
and locally popular for a long period of time (Smith, 2013), and
their local electoral and organisational strength in these constitu-
encies post-2010 suggested that they might be able to mitigate the
effects of a collapse in their national vote share (Johnson, 2014). As
the Liberal Democrats’ election strategist Ryan Coetzee (2015) has
outlined, the party embarked on a targeted consolidation strategy,
focusing almost entirely on seats where they had the incumbent
MP.
How defensive was the Liberal Democrat campaign in the 2015
general election? One method of answering this question is to2 It should be noted that there was a major polling error over the 2010 parlia-
ment. While the estimates for the Liberal Democrats were broadly correct, we do
not know that this was correct throughout the entire parliament.
3 Candidates lose their deposit (£500) when they win less than five per cent of
the vote in a constituency election.examine the visits made by party leaders to constituencies. During
election campaigns party leaders tour the country, visiting con-
stituencies and candidates. Political parties ‘weaponise’ their
leaders at the local level, bringing the national campaign if not on to
people’s doorsteps, then on to the streets that surround them.
Leader Nick Clegg, accompanied by the media, spent the weeks of
the campaign touring the country in his battle bus (accidentally
killing a pigeon along the way), donning hard hats and high-vis
jackets as the occasion demanded. The bus broke down on more
than one occasion and the occupants (including a heavy Press
contingent) headed off to the local pub. Such visits made by party
leaders can have a significant impact on party vote share at the local
level (Carty and Eagles, 2005; Holbrook, 2002), with Nick Clegg’s
visits during the 2010 general election campaign boosting the
Liberal Democrats’ vote share on average by 1.5 percentage points
(Middleton, 2015).
Table 1 identifies the number of constituencies visited by the
three main party leaders during the 2015 general election
campaign, and what percentage were to seats held by their own
party. By isolating the incumbency of the constituencies visited, it is
possible to identify expansionist visits (to seats held by other
parties) and defensive visits (to seats already held). The evidence
from Table 1 confirms that Nick Clegg ran the most defensive visit
strategy of all three party leaders, with almost three quarters of his
visits being to seats held by the Liberal Democrats. In the final three
days of campaigning alone (4e6th May), all bar one of the 15
constituencies he visited were being defended by his own party.
Contrast this to 2010, when just 23.9 percent of his total number of
visits were to seats his party already held (Middleton, 2015).
As indicated by Nick Clegg’s visits to constituencies the party
already held, the Liberal Democrats were running a defensive
electoral strategy. However, to understand the impact that this
defensive strategy had on local results, we must consider the local
electoral contexts and explore the types of seats where the Liberal
Democrats lost votes. Table 2 breaks down the falls in the party’s
vote share according to whether the Liberal Democrats held the
seat or were the second-placed party. In seats held by the Liberal
Democrats, their vote share dropped on average three percentage
points less than where they were placed second, although this was
still insufficient to retain 49 of their seats.
To examine these seats in more detail, Table 2 also identifies the
vulnerability of the constituency (Jacobson, 1987) by isolating safe
andmarginal constituencies. Once these two incumbency scenarios
are disaggregated according to whether the seat was marginal or
safe, the falls in vote share take on an interesting pattern. In the
constituencies that the party already held, they did worse in those
that were safe. The largest drop in a safe Liberal Democrat-held
constituency came in Bristol West, where the incumbent Stephen
Table 1
Visits by party leaders during the 2015 short campaign.
Number of constituencies visited Visits in 2015 to constituencies held by their own party (%) Change from 2010 (%)
David Cameron 69 56.5 þ49.2
Ed Miliband 51 33.3 53.8
Nick Clegg 44 70.4 þ46.5
Source: Leadership visits to constituencies between 30 March 2015 and 6 May 2015. Data from 2010 retrieved from Middleton (2015).
Table 2
Liberal Democrat vote share change according to incumbency and marginality.
Percentage point change 2010e2015
Overall 15.1
Liberal Democrat held 15.7
Marginal 15.0
Safe 16.3
Liberal Democrat challenger 18.7
Marginal 22.7
Safe 18.0
Liberal Democrat held, Conservative challenger 16.4
Liberal Democrat held, Labour challenger 15.0
Liberal Democrat held, SNP challenger 3.3a
Seats won in 2005 but lost in 2010 21.7
Source: 2015 British Election Study Constituency Dataset.
N.B: Safe/marginal is classified according to the percentage majority of the constituency going into the 2015 election. Marginal seats have a
majority of 9.99 percentage points, safe seats 10.00 points. For a discussion of the appropriateness of this measure see Cornford and Dorling
(1997).
a Gordon was the only constituency where the Scottish National Party was in second place prior to the 2015 election. Overall, in seats the SNP
gained from the Liberal Democrats, their vote share fell on average by 10.1 percentage points.
Table 3
Liberal Democrat vote share change for retiring MPs and first time MPs.
% Change 2010e2015
Retiring
MP stood down (11) 21.8
MP did not stand down (46) 14.3
Independent samples t-test 3.386**
First-time incumbency
First-time incumbent MP (10) 10.9
MP elected before 2010 (36) 16.7
Independent samples t-test 2.084*
Source: 2015 British Election Study Constituency Dataset.
NB: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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seat and coming third. However, the reverse is true for the seats in
which the party were second, with the Liberal Democrat vote share
falling on average 4.7 percentage points more in marginal seats
where they were in second place. This raises the possibility that the
party may have been punished by voters according to their distance
to power: the party’s vote share fell less where they were more
vulnerable (both in their marginal seats or a distantly-placed sec-
ond), yet in seats where they were close to winning (those they
held safely or where their second-placed challenger stood a
reasonable chance) the drop in their vote was greater.
As Table 2 demonstrates, the Liberal Democrats did particularly
badly in seats where their challengers were the Conservatives. It
would appear that the ‘Black Widow Effect’ for the junior coalition
partner came true (Bale, 2012). Research by Green and Prosser
(2015) shows that Labour were the largest beneficiary of the Lib-
eral Democrat collapse in terms of votes across all constituencies in
Britain, but that this predominantly served to take votes away from
the Liberal Democrats in seats where they were being challenged
by the Conservatives. Paradoxically, Labour’s gain in Liberal Dem-
ocrat votes was the Conservatives’ gain in Liberal Democrat seats.
Perhaps unsurprisingly the Liberal Democrats did particularly badly
in the 13 seats they won in the 2005 general election but lost in the
2010 election, with the party’s vote share in these seats dropping by
an average of 21.7 percentage points. Considering that the party
had lost these seats when they were relatively popular, rebuilding
the party vote share in these seats in the post-coalition environ-
ment seems to have been a tall order.
Examinations of candidate incumbency have identified two key
points at which it impacts party electoral performance: when an
MP retires and when an MP defends their first election as the
incumbent (Norris et al., 1992). In constituencies where a sittingMP
retires, their party’s vote share performs comparatively worse than
in other constituencies where the party is standing as either
incumbent or challenger. This phenomenon is known as the
retirement slump (Cain et al., 1987) and is attributed to the loss ofthe personal vote cultivated by the retiring MP over the course of
their career. In the case of the Liberal Democrats, whose in-
cumbency advantage over both the Conservatives and Labour is
comparatively large (Smith, 2013), the loss of an incumbent MP
through retirement is likely to hit the party’s local vote share
particularly hard. To examine whether MP retirement impacted
Liberal Democrat local performance in 2015, Table 3 compares vote
share in seats where the incumbent Liberal Democrat MP retired
with seats where the incumbent Liberal Democrat MP fought again.
A clear and significant difference can be found, with Liberal Dem-
ocrat vote share falling by an average of 21.8 percentage points in
seats where the sitting MP retired, compared with a fall of 14.3
percentage points where the sitting MP remained. This shows a
clear difference: the party suffered particularly heavily where the
personal vote of the retiringMPwas lost, performing 7.5 percentage
points worse on average.
This is not to suggest that Liberal Democrat MPs who retired
would have won had they remained a candidate (the sheer scale of
defeat for many Liberal Democrat MPs suggests that only Don
Foster in Bath and Sir Menzies Campbell in Fife North East pre-
sented any realistic possibility). However, in some seats the damage
might have been countered enough by an incumbent MP seeking
Table 4
Difference between first-time incumbent MPs and other seats, 2015 general election.
Liberal Democrat (%) Conservative (%) Labour (%)
First-time incumbent bonus over all candidates þ5.8 þ3.2 ±0
First-time incumbents bonus over retiring MPs þ10.9 þ2.8 þ0.3
Source: 2015 British Election Study Constituency Dataset.
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more importantly, the eight Liberal Democrat seats that the party
retained might have changed hands had their candidates retired.
Five of the remaining eight Liberal Democrat MPs’ majorities are
within the 7.5 per cent average drop; of the other three, both Mark
Williams’ majority in Ceredigion and Norman Lamb’s majority in
Norfolk North are only 8.2 percentage points.4 On this basis, the
incumbency factor was not strong enough to stop the Liberal
Democrats losing the majority of their seats, but appears strong
enough to have stopped them losing even more.
The second point at which constituency incumbency impacts
party performance is the ‘sophomore surge’ observed in in-
cumbents defending their first election (Gelman and King, 1990).
These candidates typically do better than both the party’s longer-
serving MPs and their yet-to-be-elected candidates; they spend
their first term building and consolidating their personal vote in
their constituency, with the pay-off at their first election as the
incumbent. In the case of the Liberal Democrats, first time in-
cumbents tend to do particularly well (Cutts, 2012) compared to
their other candidates. This was reflected in 2015, as Table 3 in-
dicates, the Liberal Democrats’ ten first-time incumbents per-
formed better (or less worse) than their longer serving
counterparts. Where an MP was fighting their first election as the
incumbent, the Liberal Democrat vote share fell by an average of
10.9 percentage points, compared to an average of 16.7 points for
the party’s MPs elected before 2010. Yet all first-time Liberal
Democrat MPs who stood in 2015 lost their seat; the sophomore
surge was insufficient to protect them. This failure of what is
generally seen as a beneficial surge to the vote can be explained by
looking at the types of constituencies that these first-time MPs
were defending. All, bar one (Cambridge, where Julian Huppert was
defending a 13.2 percentage point majority), were marginal. The
first time incumbents, while insulated from the severity of the drop
in the Liberal Democrat vote share, suffered more proportionally in
their marginal constituencies than their longer-standing
colleagues.
Table 4shows the electoral bonus for Liberal Democrat first-time
incumbent MPs compared with all Liberal Democrat candidates,
and retiring candidates for the party, and compares this with the
bonus for first-time incumbent MPs in the Conservative and Labour
parties. The Liberal Democrats’ first-time incumbency bonus over
all the party’s candidates and also candidates where the Liberal
Democrat MP had retired remains strong, with an advantage of 5.8
and 10.9 percentage points respectively. In short, the Liberal
Democrats’ first-time incumbency bonus was strong, and particu-
larly strong relative to other parties. Of course, the Liberal Demo-
crats’ problem at the next election is that they currently have no
first-time incumbents. For the Liberal Democrats’ future electoral
prospects, it would appear vital that their eight remaining incum-
bent MPs stand as candidates at the next general election to avoid
the retirement slump. The Liberal Democrats’ experience suggests
that incumbency remains one source of electoral advantage for
political parties, but as Smith (2013) concludes, its effect should not4 The remaining Liberal Democrat MP, Tim Farron, has a majority of 18.3 per-
centage points in Westmoreland and Lonsdale.be exaggerated. It is one factor of many in determining electoral
advantage or disadvantage, and in the Liberal Democrats’ case was
overwhelmed by national factors. The next section examines such
factors in more detail.4. Individual predictors of Liberal Democrat support
The previous section used aggregate level data to examine the
constituency campaigning strategy and incumbency benefits for
the Liberal Democrats. While it highlights the continued impor-
tance of local campaigning and incumbency for the party, it does
not explain the individual reasons behind the Liberal Democrats’
collapse. This section addresses those, examining the explanations
for challenges outlined for junior coalition parties in the compar-
ative literature, using data from the pre- and post-electionwaves of
the 2015 British Election Study to produce a binary logistic
regression model. The dependent variable is a measure asking
whether or not respondents voted Liberal Democrat in the 2015
general election. Given the large sample size of the 2015 British
Election Study (N ¼ 30027), it is possible to focus on a specific
subset of cases and still have a large sample. This study focuses
solely on those respondents that voted Liberal Democrat in the
2010 general election, and the reasons behind their support (or lack
of it) for the party in the 2015 general election. This is done for two
reasons. First, the sheer scale of the Liberal Democrats’ defeat
suggests that they failed to pick up many new voters. Indeed, their
vote share did not increase in a single constituency. Second,
explaining the party’s collapse should examinewhy people stopped
voting for the party, as opposed to looking at those people who did
not vote for the party more broadly. Extensive analysis of this
broader question has been conducted before (see Cutts, 2012), and
understandingwhy parties lose support is an important question to
be addressed (Johnston and Pattie, 2011). The scale of the 2015
British Election Study sample allows much more targeted analysis,
still leaving a sample size of 2167 that can be included in the
regression.
As examined in the comparative section, there are a range of
explanations as to why junior coalition parties struggle in elections.
Analysis of valence issue politics suggests that junior coalition
partners find it hard to convince supporters of their influence in
coalition (Duch et al., 2015; Dunphy and Bale, 2011; Muller and
Strom, 1999). In this context, the Conservatives’ dominance
within the coalition suggests that the Liberal Democrats may not
have appeared a credible governing party with their electorate. The
model tests this in three different ways. First, the model in-
corporates a binary variable measuring whether (1) or not (0) an
individual respondent thought that a party other than a Liberal
Democrats were best on the most important issue to them. The
valencemodel suggests that if voters feel that a party other than the
Liberal Democrats to be the best on their most important issue,
then they will be less likely to vote for them. Second, the model
includes a variable asking whether respondents felt the economy
was getting better or worse. If the Liberal Democrats’ 2010 voters
accorded them credit for being in government, they should bemore
likely to support them if they felt the economy was improving.
Third, the model includes a similar variable asking whether
5 Results are presented using odds ratios, which predict the probability of an
event occurring. Higher than 1 and the effect is positive. Lower than 1 and the effect
is negative. The greater the distance from 1 (either way), the greater the effect of
the independent variable.
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worse. Throughout the parliament, the Liberal Democrats stressed
their positive influences on education policy: if their voters give
them credit for this, they should be more likely to have supported
them in 2015.
The Liberal Democrats’ difficulty in convincing supporters of
their influence within the coalition might have fostered a sense of
betrayal amongst their supporters (Cutts and Russell, 2015;
Dommett, 2013). To measure perception of betrayal, the model
makes use of the variable ‘anger at the Liberal Democrats’. Surveys
of political attitudes increasingly include questions on emotions in
relation to political action. In particular, anger is a decisive negative
emotion (Lockerbie, 1993) and arises when an external actor can be
blamed (Wagner, 2014). The sheer scale of the local, sub-national
and national electoral collapse suggests an attribution of re-
sponsibility to the Liberal Democrats by their former supporters,
and anger as an emotional response to betrayal is argued here to be
the most appropriate variable to account for any breakdown in
trust in the Liberal Democrats. As Cutts and Russell (2015: 80)
argue, ‘those voters…who had supported the Liberal Democrats…
to keep the Conservatives out were left angry and betrayed’. It is
expected that anger with the Liberal Democrats, coded (1), to be a
significant and negative predictor of voting Liberal Democrat at the
2015 general election.
The importance of party leadership to a party’s electoral for-
tunes has also beenwidely noted (Clarke et al., 2009; Stokes, 1992).
Positive attitudes to Nick Clegg were a big indicator of support for
the Liberal Democrats at the 2010 general election (Cutts, 2012;
Middleton, 2015). However, he was perceived by the electorate to
be the most incompetent of the three main leaders for most of the
2010 parliament (Denver, 2015). The model incorporates attitudes
to party leaders, measured on a 0e10 thermometer scale. Whether
respondents liked or disliked Nick Clegg is included in themodel, as
is the same measure for David Cameron and Ed Miliband.
Other factors highlighted as indicating levels of support for
political parties are also included in the model. Partisan identifi-
cation has previously been shown to be a key indicator of support
(or lack of it) for political parties. Previous research has shown that
if people develop an attachment to a party, they are more likely to
support it (Holmberg, 2003). Respondents to the British Election
Study were asked which political party, if any, they identify with. It
is expected that those who identify with the Liberal Democrats,
coded as (1), to be more likely to have supported the party at the
2015 general election.
The previous section demonstrated the continued importance of
incumbency to the Liberal Democrats, so the model controls for
whether or not the respondent was based in a constituency with a
Liberal Democrat MP. Given the importance of local campaigning to
the party (Cutts, 2014), the model also controls for whether or not a
respondent recalls being contacted by the Liberal Democrats during
the election campaign.
The model also accounts for attitudes on and perceptions of
areas of British politics that might indicate support for the Liberal
Democrats. Whether or not respondents think coalitions (1) are
more effective than single-party government (0) is included. Given
that the Liberal Democrats’ only realistic hope of national office is in
coalition with a major party, it is expected that support for co-
alitions as an effective form of government would make people
more likely to support the Liberal Democrats. However, the strong
contextual nature of local support for the Liberal Democrats sug-
gests that support for coalitions might not play a significant part.
Given the Liberal Democrats’ historical ability to win support
based on their policy stance (Green, 2015), the model also includes
key policy areas asked in the British Election Study that might
indicate support for the party. First, given the prominence of debatesurrounding the European Union in British politics between 2010
and 2015, and the Liberal Democrats’ strong support of the Euro-
pean Union (Goes, 2015), voting intention (1¼ remain, 0¼ leave) in
a referendum on the European Union is included in the model.
Second, the model also includes a variable to test the effect of the
Liberal Democrats’ policy shift on tuition fees. Prior to the 2010
general election, the Liberal Democrats made themost of a National
Union of Students campaign to abolish tuition fees. Many of their
parliamentary candidates, including party leader Nick Clegg,
proudly held a card in front of the cameras pledging to abolish
tuition fees. Whatever its immediate electoral benefit, it was
fundamentally naïve. The Conservatives’ intention was always to
implement the recommendations of the Browne review (increasing
tuition fees to £9000), and the Liberal Democrats went back on
their promise. However, a number of Liberal Democrat MPs
rebelled and voted against the move. The model questions whether
or not a rebelling MP (1) was more successful in holding on to
Liberal Democrat voters than a non-rebelling MP (0). There is
debate within the academic literature as to the effect of tuition fees
on the Liberal Democrats’ support (Curtice, 2015a; Cutts and
Russell, 2015). Comparative evidence suggests that while voters
do hold their MPs accountable, it is general, and MPs tend not to be
rewarded for rebellion on a ‘particularly salient single issue’
(Vivyan and Wagner, 2012: 259). Whether or not rebelling MPs
performed better will contribute further to this discussion. Finally,
the model includes the respondent’s age, sex, and whether or not
they have a degree as socio-demographic control variables.
Table 5 shows the results of a logistic regression model pre-
dicting support for the Liberal Democrats in the 2015 general
election amongst respondents who supported the party in the 2010
general election.5 Together the overall model worked well, with a
pseudo R-square of 0.51. Firstly, the argument that the Liberal
Democrats’ collapse can be explained due to a perceived lack of
competence is supported. Those that felt a party other than the
Liberal Democrats were the best on the most important issue in
British politics to them were less likely to support the party. The
very small odds ratio highlights the strength of this negativity. The
problems that the party had to be noticed in coalition appear to
have done the party great damage in the 2015 general election.
Alongside this, whether or not respondents felt that the economy
or the education system got better under the coalition government
made them no more likely to vote Liberal Democrat in 2015. This
supports comparative arguments that junior coalition parties
struggle to have influence in government (Duch et al., 2015;
Dunphy and Bale, 2011; Muller and Strom, 1999).
Those who liked then Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg were
more likely to support the Liberal Democrats; however the odds
ratio’s proximity to one suggests that his positive impact was much
smaller than in 2010 (Cutts, 2012; Middleton, 2015). Attitudes to
David Cameron had no significant effect on Liberal Democrat sup-
port, while those 2010 Liberal Democrat voters who liked Ed
Miliband were less likely to support the Liberal Democrats at the
2015 general election.
The explanation that the Liberal Democrats lost support due a
perception of betrayal is also strongly supported. Those who were
angry with the Liberal Democrats were less likely to vote for them
in the 2015 general election. Again, the small odds ratio highlights
the strength of this negativity. The distrust that once benefitted the
Liberal Democrats at the expense of the Labour and Conservative
Table 5
Logistic regression detailing predictors of 2015 Liberal Democrat support.
Odds ratio
Competence and trust
Other parties best on most important issue 0.21***
The economy is improving 1.01
Education system is improving 1.11
Nick Clegg 1.22***
David Cameron 0.96
Ed Miliband 0.93**
Angry with the Liberal Democrats 0.35***
Party identification, incumbency and campaigning
Identifies with the Liberal Democrats 3.45***
Liberal Democrat incumbent 6.68***
Liberal Democrat contact before election 3.07***
Attitudes and perceptions
Coalitions more effective than single-party govt 1.11
Support Britain’s membership of the EU 1.68**
Liberal Democrat MP rebelled on tuition fees 0.68
Socio-demographic factors
Age 1.02***
Sex 0.90
Degree 1.00
Constant 0.02***
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 ¼ 0.51
2 Log Likelihood ¼ 1616.779
Source: 2015 British Election Study (pre- and post-election waves). (Fieldhouse et al., 2015).
N ¼ 2167 (Sample of 2010 Liberal Democrat voters).
Bold figures denote significant effects: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Dependent variable: Voted Liberal Democrat in 2015 general election.
Source: 2015 British Election Study (pre- and post-election waves). (Fieldhouse et al., 2015).
C. Johnson, A. Middleton / Electoral Studies 43 (2016) 63e71 69parties has now engulfed them too. While they can claim a series of
individual policy success and limitations on their Conservative
coalition partners, they ultimately failed to distinguish themselves
as the junior coalition partner. As Dommett (2013) argues, the effort
to rebuild trust with voters will be a long and painful process.
The key lessons from the comparative literature on junior coa-
lition parties is that they must appear competent and influential in
government, maintain trust with their supporters and make the
most of their leadership (Duch et al., 2015; Dunphy and Bale, 2011;
Paun and Munro, 2013). On all three issues, the Liberal Democrats
were unable to convince the electorate. Their perceived incompe-
tence and lack of influence cost them heavily, those who were
angry with the party deserted them and Nick Clegg was not the
overwhelmingly positive contributor to Liberal Democrat support
that he was in 2010. Together, these three issues did great damage
to the Liberal Democrats in the 2015 general election.
What was the effect of other explanations of support for political
parties? Party identification continues to be a strong indicator of
party support. Those who identified with the Liberal Democrats
were more likely to vote for the party in 2015. This was a strong
indicator of Liberal Democrat support. There were statistically
significant predictors relating to the 2010e2015 parliament. As
expected, being in a Liberal Democrat incumbent constituency
made a respondent more likely to support the Liberal Democrats in
2015. Respondents who recalled being contacted by the Liberal
Democrats during the four weeks prior to the 2015 general election
were also more likely to support the party.6 With strong respective
odds ratios, incumbency and campaigning continues to benefit the
party.
Attitudes to and perceptions of policies also had a mixed effect6 It was suggested that we compared this effect with an earlier pre-election
contact variable. This was done, but it did not change the results, and heavily
reduced the number of respondents, so the model stands with the post-election
variable.on support for the Liberal Democrats. Those whowould vote to stay
in the European Union were also more likely to support the Liberal
Democrats in the 2015 general election. However, whether or not a
respondent preferred coalitions to single-party government made
no difference. On the issue of tuition fees, if a respondent lived in a
constituency with a Liberal Democrat MP that rebelled on tuition
fees they were no more likely to support the party at the general
election. Those MPs who rebelled on tuition fees do not appear to
have reaped any electoral reward. While this does not settle the
debate about the effect of tuition fees on the party more broadly
(see Curtice, 2015a; Cutts and Russell, 2015), it supports evidence
that rebelling on a single salient issue does not lead to subsequent
electoral reward (Vivyan and Wagner, 2012). Finally, older re-
spondents were more likely than younger respondents to support
the Liberal Democrats. Whether a respondent was male or female
made no difference, nor did whether or not they had a degree. In
short, the Liberal Democrats failed to convince the electorate on the
key issues of competence, distinctiveness and leadership.5. Conclusion
The Liberal Democrats’ performance in the 2015 general election
provides an opportunity to examine the only case in the post-war
period of a national junior coalition partner in British politics. The
comparative literature on coalitions suggested that they faced a
series of challenges: they needed to appear competent in govern-
ment; they needed to make a positive and distinctive contribution
to the country that was recognised by the electorate; and they
needed to make the most of political leadership to promote their
participation in coalition. Most evidence suggests that junior coa-
lition parties struggle to overcome these challenges, although some
positive examples exist (Bale, 2012; Paun and Munro, 2013).
Alongside this, the Liberal Democrats’ have enjoyed particular
electoral success due to incumbency and constituency campaigning
(Cutts, 2014; Smith, 2013). The 2015 general election provided the
party with a huge, uphill challenge. Due to the fall in their national
C. Johnson, A. Middleton / Electoral Studies 43 (2016) 63e7170popularity, the party embarked on a highly defensive strategy,
focusing almost entirely on their incumbent seats.
Using aggregate-level and individual-level data, this article has
examined the Liberal Democrats’ success in combatting the chal-
lenges outlined above. At the aggregate level, the article finds that
incumbency was unable to stem the far greater national tides
hitting Liberal Democrat support. The first-time incumbency
‘sophomore’ bonus remained, and was stronger for the Liberal
Democrats than the Conservative and Labour parties, but was also
unable to protect them.While their first-time incumbent MPs were
able to build up levels of support in their first five years in office,
they lacked the time to build up substantial enough majorities to
withstand the heavy fall in national vote share. However, without
the incumbency factor the return of seats might have been even
worse. The party did particularly badly where their MPs had
stepped down. Future research should continue to examine the
positive impact of incumbency for political parties. For the Liberal
Democrats, it appears vital that their current small crop of MPs stay
to contest their seats at the next general election.
Individual level analysis shows that the main challenges set out
for the Liberal Democrats as a junior coalition party ultimately
defeated them. First, they were unable to convince their 2010
voters that they were a credible coalition partner that would be
competent in government. Second, they failed to make a contri-
bution to government so distinctive from their Conservative part-
ners that cut through to their electorate, and perception of betrayal
as a consequence cost them badly. Third, their reliance on then
leader Nick Clegg was a huge boost for the Liberal Democrats in
2010, but he was unable to have such a strong positive effect in
2015. Together, these three factors provide key explanations of the
Liberal Democrats’ collapse in the 2015 general election.
The continuing likelihood of hung parliaments following future
general elections in Britain (Curtice, 2015b) means that co-
operation between political parties is not off the table, and the
Liberal Democrats’ experience is a valuable lesson for analysis both
of British politics and more comparative work on coalitions. In
future, junior coalition parties in Britain must find a way to balance
unity within coalition alongside trust and competence with the
electorate. In many respects, the Liberal Democrats were well
prepared for coalition. They produced alongside the Conservatives
a detailed and binding coalition agreement, held important cabinet
posts and implemented much of their manifesto. However, they
ultimately failed to convince the electorate of their influence and
their experience in government stands as a monumental electoral
failure. Their local, sub-national and now national electoral base
has been fundamentally weakened, and it will take a monumental
effort to rebuild it.
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